Category Archives: Investing

Indian startup regulations: beyond the rhetoric

Friction=Waste=Startup Failure

In India currently, the government provides more incentives for investors to invest in shares in Reliance Industries than in a fledgling startup. While successive Governments have made big pronouncements about the value of entrepreneurship and boosting startups with grand schemes like the Fund announced by Narendra Modi in 2014 and the Start up, Stand up program in 2015, relatively little has been done to enable the startup ecosystem on a basic, practical level. Rather than government-backed solutions that focus on investing in startups and the like, what the ecosystem really needs the government to do is to ease the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles that currently plague entrepreneurs. To a large extent, as with a lot of things in India, the entrepreneurial ecosystem that has developed has done so in spite of the State, rather than because of the State. The State would be well to take further steps to reduce hindrances to growth for startups rather than proactively try to mandate things. Startups would be best served if the government reduced its involvement and did away with elements that obstruct startup growth.

Here is my short-list of some laws that currently plague entrepreneurship in India that could be addressed by (relatively simple and thus implementable) policy adjustments:

  • Equity Investment into Startups – The requirement to justify fair value to the taxman: Based on a law passed in 2014, if a private company raises money from an individual investor at a price higher than par value, the Company has to prove to the Tax Assessing Officer that the transaction is at a fair price. This is a ridiculous rule that basically that requires and puts the onus on the entrepreneur to justify the seed/angel/VC round capital raise price to the tax authority. I believe the government’s thought process in enacting this rule was to stem the flow of black money into dummy private companies but clearly this seems like a case of throwing the baby out with the bath water. Based on this rule, every Company needs to satisfactorily defend its share price to the assessing officer, and if it doesn’t the amount of capital raised would be automatically considered taxable income in the hands of the Company. So, if you raise 1 crore from angel investors and the AO doesn’t agree with your valuation, the 1 crore would be considered taxable income for the startup and taxed as income with a 30% tax rate.
  • Equity Investment into Startups – Long Term Capital Gain rate applies after 3 years rather than 1 year if an investor invests in public equities: For several years now, investments into private company shares had less favorable capital gain treatment compared to public company shares. Investors investing in publicly listed companies enjoyed a 0% tax rate on long-term capital gains, whereas investors in private companies were taxed at 20% on long-term capital gains. But now, based on the changes effected by the Finance Act 2014, private company shares are at an even greater disadvantage relative to public shares. The definition of long-term capital gain has been changed from the earlier level of 12 months to new level of 36 months. An investor has to hold the private company shares for 36 months for it to be classified as long-term whereas his holding in public company shares qualify as long-term after a 12 month holding period. If the intent is to provide impetus to investment in startups and small private companies, this is a counter-intuitive policy. We should be looking at ways of providing incentives for people to invest in small private companies rather than disincentivize them from buying startup shares and nudging them to buy shares in Reliance Industries and Tata Steel instead.
  • Loans to startups – basically not allowed: Based on changes made to the Finance Act 2014, no individuals other than directors can extend a loan to a Company. Earlier, directors and their families were permitted to extend loans. Still earlier, even members (shareholders) were allowed to extend loans to a company. This is a significant constraint for a new company. Loans from friends and families may often be the only way for you as an entrepreneur to get a business off the ground. If that avenue is no longer open, your options are much more limited. You are allowed to take a loan from a bank, but the chances of a bank extending a loan to a startup are miniscule.
  • Payments to foreigners – painful right now: as a country with capital controls, we have a series of laws that put restrictions on foreign exchange transactions. This also includes laws that define processes around payments to foreigners, whether in Rupees or in foreign currency. While a lot of people are not aware of these laws, they define a process whereby you must make disclosures and get documentation from a chartered accountant prior to making the payment. As an example, if a Company has to make a payment to Facebook for Business which is a foreign company, the Company must first fill a Form on the Tax Department (Form 15CA) website, and then get a Chartered Accountant certificate (Form 15CB) confirming the tax rate applicable. This must be done prior to buying the service. These kinds of rules are an annoyance for big firms but are much more harmful for startups. Unlike big companies, small companies do not have the bandwidth or the knowhow to deal with this kind of issue. They probably don’t have a team of chartered accountants and company secretaries to guide them through FEMA regulations. The reality is they will either ignore the rules and thus risk prosecution, or they will try to educate themselves and abide by the rules which will cost time and money. Speed is the essence of a startup, and impediments to speed such as this, are very detrimental to startup success.

While I am sure most countries have laws that could hinder the speed with which startups can access capital and operate, I think that the problem in India is that these structural constraints incentivize capital to flow to areas other than startups, limit the financing options available to startups and generally reduce the speed and bandwidth within a startup. Getting a startup off the ground is incredibly hard as it is. More hurdles that serve to reduce the probability of startup success, only make things harder. While currently the easy money environment across the globe coupled with the hype surrounding Indian startups has provided a window of opportunity for many startups to set up and get funded, my fear is that the difficult operating environment will result in sub-standard performance and investment returns and could sour the picture when people start expecting a return on their capital. In an environment where there is an abundance of private investment capital looking for returns, the government would be better served focusing on creating an atmosphere conducive to startup/business success rather than trying to directly invest or bolster early-stage venture funds.

Hopefully, the Indian government will look to remove some of these structural impediments to startup growth, along with announcing the splashy big-ticket entrepreneurial initiatives that they have been. A combination of these efforts could truly create a robust startup ecosystem and allow entrepreneurs to achieve their full potential.

Aman Chowdhury

September 2015

Asset Returns in India

If you talk to folks and pick up anecdotal evidence, you would learn that a lot of money seems to have been made by investing in real estate in India. Those of us who live in India constantly bump into real estate brokers driving fancy cars and are regaled by stories of farmers selling their land for millions, and friends whose investment properties have quadrupled in 2 years! I had my team at Cians Analytics take a deeper look at the real data, and to compare and contrast what returns different asset classes have given in India over the last 23 years (since the economic liberalization of the country starting in 1991).

Asset Returns in India (1991-2013)

The results are presented in the attached paper (above), but I am summarizing the key points below:

  • Unlike in the US, where a Robert Shiller (arguably the most knowledgeable commentator on the real estate markets) has posited that real estate is at best an asset that barely covers inflation, in India the data looks quite different. In fact, in India, it appears that real estate returns have comfortably exceeded all other asset classes. That being said, our view is that one should be very careful about how one invests in the real estate sector. While real estate returns seem to have been high on average, as an asset class it is highly illiquid and in India comes with a substantial amount of credit risk (if buying real estate from a developer) and is plagued by substantial black/grey market dealing. Honest investors are at a disadvantage and usually can’t exact full value and returns.
  • The stock market has given a healthy return on an absolute basis (~15.5 % per annum), however if you factor in inflation, the real return is only ~7.1% p.a.
  • That also begs the question of whether investors are getting adequately compensated for their risk by investing in India. If the real return in Indian equities is only 7.1% per annum, does it make sense for a foreign investor (for example a US investor) to take on the additional risk of investing in India rather than investing in their local markets. During the period of possibly the highest growth in the Indian economy, the Indian equity market returned only 7.1% on a real basis, while the US equity market returned 7.3% — basically implying that investors who chose to invest in India got no benefit for the extra risk they took on by investing in India (note that this holds true without even factoring in currency devaluation which would have made Indian returns seem even more unattractive)
  • Obviously, investment decisions are not made by looking in the rear-view mirror, but history can provide pointers for how asset classes react to different external conditions and stimuli

 

Aman Chowdhury. May 2014.

Quick Math: Rule of 72

Most people who have an interest in investing understand the power of compounding — putting something away today at a certain rate of interest, will reap a significant benefit tomorrow simply due to the power of compound interest.

One can use a shortcut method to figure out exactly how much return you would make due to compounding by utilizing the rule of 72:

  • Simply put, if you earn 6% per year and let it compound, your investment would double in 12 years (72/6=12).
  • If you earn 8% per year, it would double in 9 years and so on.

By using the rule of 72, you can solve for 1 of the 2 variables — if you know return per year, you can figure out the duration taken to double the investment. If you know the duration to double, you can figure out the % rate.

Try it. It works. Its an approximation but an effective tool. As they say, better to be approximately right than precisely wrong!

Seriously? Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rules

Having had some experience with dealing with raising FDI capital over the course of the last several years, I was somewhat perplexed with some of the strange rules.

Explain this:

India’s FDI rules have an interesting provision related to valuation of a private company. The rule basically states that an Indian resident (including a Company) cannot sell shares to a foreign resident at a price below its fair value.

Ok, fair enough. The government wants to protect Indian residents from potentially unfair foreign investors (don’t agree with the premise, but I guess I can understand that some could).

Now, here is where it gets interesting. In order to determine the fair value of the shares, a Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) analysis must be conducted, and the price arrived at based on the DCF is said to be “fair”.

Then, the foreign investor MUST invest at a price equal to or higher than the fair value, as determined by the DCF.

Obviously, from the Investor’s point-of-view, the DCF value is the fair value. In order for any investor to invest in an asset, they must believe that they are buying the asset at less than the fair value. However, the FDI rules pretty much guarantees that one cannot buy at less than the fair value. That basically means that either the Investor has a completely different valuation approach that somehow justifies paying more than the DCF valuation, or that the Investor is looking at a completely different set of projections than what is submitted to the Reserve Bank of India by the Investee Company.

Quite a bizarre rule. Pretty much forcing firms to fudge numbers. Hope better sense prevails when the new government revisits some of the existing laws.

 

Aman Chowdhury

March 2014

www.amanchowdhury.com